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ARTICLES
How We Prosecute the Police
KATE LEVINE*

Police brutality is at the center of a growing national conversation on
state power, race, and our problematic law enforcement culture. Focus
on police conduct, in particular when and whether it should be criminal,
is on the minds of scholars and political actors like never before. Yet this
new focus has brought up a host of undertheorized questions about how
the police are treated when they become the subject of criminal
prosecutions.
This Article is part of a larger project wherein I examine the ways in
which criminal procedure is different for the police than other suspects.
Here, my focus is on the seemingly special precharge and preindictment
process that police receive. Prosecutors have the discretion to investigate
cases before charging and to present robust cases to grand juries for any
suspect. Yet, most charging decisions are reflexive and uninvestigated.
Similarly, most grand jury hearings are dominated entirely by prosecutors who present one-sided, highly curated versions of events. As we have
seen repeatedly, however, when police liberty is on the line, these processes change: prosecutors tend to conduct a thorough precharge investigation and they present a full account of an accusation, including exculpatory
evidence, to grand juries.
This thorough criminal process has led to what many see as a lack of
criminal accountability for police. In response, scholars and politicians
have called for prosecutors to treat the police more like other suspects: to
strip the police of the precharge/preindictment process they receive.
Here, I argue that the reverse solution is far more powerful: prosecutors
should extend the precharge and preindictment process they give police
to all criminal suspects. A host of reformative possibilities would flow
from more careful investigation and evidence weighing before a criminal
suspect is charged or indicted. Moreover, reallocating resources to this
important moment in the criminal justice process could reduce the untenable costs of our overburdened system.

* Acting Assistant Professor of Lawyering, NYU School of Law. © 2016, Kate Levine. For helpful
conversations and comments on drafts, thanks to Rachel Barkow, Josh Bowers, Erin Collins, Russell
Gold, Rachel Harmon, Erin Murphy, Lauren Ouziel, Paul Pineau, Daniel Richman, Nirej Sekhon, and
Jocelyn Simonson. Thanks also to the participants in the Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze, Crimfest,
and the NYU Lawyering Scholarship Colloquium, the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal for
careful and thorough editing, and John Cusick for excellent research assistance.

745

746

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 104:745

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

746

I. CHARGING DECISIONS IN AN AGE OF MASS PLEA BARGAINING . . . . . .

751

II. COMPARING PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURES FOR MOST SUSPECTS AND
THE POLICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

757

A.

PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURE FOR MOST SUSPECTS

...........

757

B.

PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURE FOR POLICE SUSPECTS

...........

762

III. THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF THIS PICTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

767

A.

THE PERILS OF PROCESS FOR THE POLICE

..................

B.

THE PROMISE OF PRECHARGE/PREINDICTMENT PROCESS

767

........

770

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

775

INTRODUCTION
When Robert McCulloch, the St. Louis County prosecuting attorney, announced that there would be no indictment in the shooting death of teenager
Michael Brown by Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson, the decision engendered public outrage.1 But his announcement and the release of the grand jury
transcripts from the hearings raised the hackles of those familiar with the
criminal justice system for another reason. The process Wilson received was
virtually unrecognizable to those familiar with the way grand juries operate for
most suspects. The published transcripts showed a host of differences from the
normal picture of a modern grand jury hearing, during which prosecutors
present highly curated and inculpatory pieces of their case designed to induce

1. See Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. McCulloch, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014, 8:15 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/statementof-st-louis-prosecuting-attorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-9b4b-5e1e-9043-f586f389ef91.
html; see also Tamara Aparton, SF Public Defender’s Statement on Grand Jury Decision, SF PUB.
DEFENDER (Nov. 26, 2014), http://sfpublicdefender.org/news/2014/11/sf-public-defenders-statement-ongrand-jury-decision/; Sara Hossaini, Public Defenders Hold ‘Black Lives Matter’ Rallies for Police
Accountability, KQED NEWS (Dec. 18, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/12/18/public-defendershold-black-lives-matter-rallies-for-police-accountability/ (“Public defenders in San Francisco, Alameda,
Contra Costa, Santa Clara and Solano counties protested in support of national outrage over decisions
not to indict police officers involved in the deaths of unarmed black men.”); Joan McCarter, Bob
McCulloch: Prosecutor or Defense Attorney for Darren Wilson?, DAILY KOS (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:42 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/11/25/1347403/-Bob-McCulloch-Prosecutor-or-defense-attorneyfor-Darren-Wilson#; Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill, President & Dir.-Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. &
Edu. Fund, Inc., to Hon. Maura McShane, Judge, 21st Judicial Circuit 2 (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.
naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/NAACP%20LDF%20Open%20Letter%20to%20Judge%20Maura%20Mc
Shane.pdf (calling for an investigation into the State v. Darren Wilson Grand Jury Proceedings for,
among other things, preferential treatment of the defendant and erroneous instructions on the law).
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quick and sure indictments.2 The Ferguson grand jury instead heard “every
statement” and “every bit of evidence” in the proceeding that they were told
would be “like a trial.”3 As the transcripts revealed, they heard dozens of
witnesses, including Darren Wilson, and examined reams of evidence.4 Only
after this “trial” did the jury decide not to indict.
For the most part, public outrage at McCulloch and other district attorneys
has focused on how only a few officers are held criminally accountable for
what, to many, appear to be violent, criminal acts of brutality and murder
against primarily African-American men, women, and children. Regardless of
whether criminal law is the most effective way of reforming our problematic
police culture, many people want to see the police held accountable. Thus, the
thorough grand jury presentations in the Brown case and other police brutality
cases have been roundly criticized by criminal justice advocates as a way for
partisan prosecutors to shield the police.5
Scholarly critiques of prosecutorial discretion tend to focus on what happens
after a prosecutor decides to charge a suspect or gets a grand jury indictment.
One rich strand of scholarship describes the many problems with plea bargaining, including the lawless grey area in which it operates and the funding and
power differentials between prosecutors and defense attorneys.6 Another set of
scholarship looks at the ways in which prosecutors turn a blind eye to, or
actively hide, evidence that might exculpate a defendant, both before and after a
conviction or guilty plea is finalized.7 Reams of scholarship look at the lack of

2. See Jeffrey Fagan & Bernard E. Harcourt, Professors Fagan and Harcourt Provide Facts on
Grand Jury Practice in Light of Ferguson Decision, COLUMB. L. SCH. (Dec. 5, 2015, 12:00 PM)
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/november2014/Facts-on-FergusonGrand-Jury; see also infra Section II.A. See generally Transcript of Grand Jury Missouri v. Wilson
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://int.nyt.com/newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-evidence/assets/gj-testimony/grandjury-volume-01.pdf.
3. Transcript of Grand Jury at 8, 9, 21, Missouri v. Wilson (Aug. 20, 2014), http://int.nyt.com/
newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-evidence/assets/gj-testimony/grand-jury-volume-01.pdf; see also infra notes 125–29.
4. See infra Section II.B. For an interesting critical take on Wilson’s testimony as evidence of a
problematic culture of race and masculinity, see L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons
from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2971 (2015) (noting that Wilson testified Brown
called him “too much of . . . a pussy to shoot”) (alteration in original).
5. See, e.g., Letter from Sherrilyn A. Ifill to Judge Maura McShane, supra note 1, at 7–9.
6. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1188 (2010) (discussing
the power differential in plea bargaining); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing
and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 783, 784 (1997) (underfunding of public defenders); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) (plea bargaining process is infected with structural problems);
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548,
2549–50 (2004) (law has limited effect on plea bargains); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution
of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 819 (2006) (“Prosecutors prone to abuse their authority
usually do so through low-visibility plea bargains . . . .”).
7. See generally Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing how
prosecutors are more likely to withhold Brady as they become more sure of their stake in a case);
Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
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judicial oversight at every stage of the process, from plea bargains to sentencing
decisions, and waivers that make pleas virtually unreviewable by appellate
courts.8 Finally, another strand of scholarship laments the many ways in which
prosecutorial discretion and secrecy affect society. One vein of this scholarship
looks at participation in the criminal justice process—searching for ways to
bring juries into plea bargaining and to protect the rights of observers.9 The
other examines the ways in which high conviction rates and imprisonment,
particularly of young, black men, rend the fabric of African-American families
and communities.10
Although each of these strands of scholarship addresses important, problematic aspects of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, this Article focuses on the
less-theorized, but potentially most important aspect of prosecutorial decision
making: the process employed when prosecutors decide whether to charge and
how to pursue an indictment of a criminal suspect.11 In particular, I will focus

531 (2007) (prosecutorial gamesmanship in the wake of Brady); Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R.
Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 263 (2011) (excessive caseloads lead to prosecutorial errors); Kate
Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the Defendant Due
Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 138 (2012) (addressing the “practice of courts forgiving
prosecutors for failing to disclose Brady evidence if the defendant or his lawyer knew or with due
diligence could have known about the evidence”).
8. See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REV.
465, 470–74 (2002) (arguing that the Apprendi line of decisions increased prosecutorial power over
sentencing); Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47
UCLA L. REV. 113, 117 (1999) (arguing that certain constitutional rights should be nonnegotiable and
that judges should be empowered to prevent defendants from giving up these rights); Susan R. Klein
et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 73, 78–92 (2015) (discussing problems with plea waivers in context of proposed ineffective
assistance of counsel waivers).
9. See Laura I Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 731 (2010) (suggesting that we
“incorporate the local community into the guilty-plea procedure through the use of a plea jury”);
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2174
(2014) (arguing that citizen observation of criminal process is “uniquely suited to help restore public
participation and accountability in a world without juries”).
10. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 18 (1998) (“[P]rosecutors, through their overall duty to pursue justice, have the responsibility to use their discretion to help eradicate the discriminatory treatment of African Americans in the
criminal justice system.”); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 383 (2013)
(arguing that juvenile prosecutors must “resist external pressures to respond punitively to exaggerated
perceptions of threat by youth of color”); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 374 (2001) (“Prosecutors uphold the banishment of a
generation of African American men simply by playing their role in the context of today’s criminal
justice system.”).
11. Some scholars, in particular Josh Bowers, have written about or acknowledged the importance of
the initial charging decision. These articles focus mostly on the decision whether to prosecute, not the
procedure prosecutors use to make such decisions. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1709 (2010)
(“[P]rosecutors’ initial decisions of what and whether to charge are somewhat dispositive on the
question of whether the defendant will ultimately end up with some type of conviction . . . .”); Davis,
supra note 10, at 21 (“The first and ‘most important function exercised by a prosecutor’ is the charging
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on the menu of procedural options prosecutors have at their disposal when
making these critical decisions.
Critics have also pointed to the numerous ways police seem to be virtually
above the criminal law. Among these criticisms are the inherently problematic,
close professional relationship between police and prosecutors,12 the favorable
substantive and constitutional laws that allow police to commit violence at a
rate some argue is not appropriate,13 and the “blue wall of silence,” in which
police either refuse to testify against one another or collude to present their
stories in the least criminal light.14
In considering prosecutors’ precharge decisions, this Article also illuminates
another way in which the police appear to receive favorable treatment when
they become criminal suspects: the amount of criminal process they receive
from prosecutors before they are charged or indicted. In particular, I identify
two processes that prosecutors could employ in any case but rarely do except
for when police liberty is on the line: precharge investigation and full evidentiary presentations to the grand jury.
Although criminal justice scholars and the public at large are enraged about
the use of these procedures in police cases,15 I argue here that the problem is not
decision.”); Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 707–08 (2014); Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (2002) (arguing that
prosecutors should use charge “‘screening’ as the principal alternative to plea bargains”).
12. See, e.g., Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(examining the conflict of interest between local prosecutors and law enforcement).
13. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 778 (2012) (arguing that
the Constitution allows police violence that is not desirable).
14. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 237 (1998) (“Police
officers . . . lie under oath because of the ‘blue wall of silence,’ an unwritten code in many departments
which prohibits . . . testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer.”);
Alexandra Holmes, Note, Bridging the Information Gap: The Department of Justice’s “Pattern or
Practice” Suits and Community Organizations, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2014) (“[T]he ‘blue wall of
silence’ that describes fellow officers’ unwillingness to testify against the defendant often prevents
prosecutors from developing a case.”).
15. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, The NYC Cop Who Strangled Eric Garner to Death is Free Thanks to a
Legal Flaw. Here’s How Voters Can Fix It., 3 NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/
article/120478/eric-garner-police-officer-shouldve-been-investigated-independently (quoting Professor
Ronald Wright about the ability to appoint special prosecutors in cases of police brutality); Paul Butler,
The System Must Counteract Prosecutors’ Natural Sympathies for Cops, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015,
12:26 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/04/do-cases-like-eric-garners-require-aspecial-prosecutor/the-system-must-counteract-prosecutors-natural-sympathies-for-cops; Paul Cassell,
Who Prosecutes the Police? Perceptions of Bias in Police Misconduct Investigations and a Possible
Remedy, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/
12/05/who-prosecutes-the-police-perceptions-of-bias-in-police-misconduct-investigations-and-apossible-remedy/; Melanie Mason, Bill Barring Grand Juries in Police Deadly Force Cases Clears
Assembly, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 16, 2015, 11:07 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-grandjuries-bill-20150716-story.html (discussing a California bill to remove police investigations from grand
juries because of secrecy and fears about bias); Noah Remnick, Cuomo to Appoint Special Prosecutor
for Killings by Police, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/nyregion/cuomoto-appoint-special-prosecutor-for-killings-by-police.html (discussing New York Governor’s executive
order appointing the State Attorney General as a special prosecutor in all police fatality cases); Howard
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the procedure prosecutors employ in such cases, but rather the inherent distributional inequality between the process given to the police and the process given
to ordinary criminal suspects. Calls to cabin prosecutors’ investigations and
grand jury presentations when police are suspects miss an important opportunity
to engage in meaningful conversation about why such process is not used for
other criminal suspects.
To that end, this Article investigates these presumed preferential procedures
as a way to upend the notion that precharge process is a system failure. In fact,
it imagines the processes that police tend to get as a critical and novel way to
reform the status quo.16 It explores what the criminal justice world might look
like if prosecutors conducted precharge investigations in every case, reallocating resources to a point in the system before a suspect became a defendant. It
argues that in such a world both innocent and guilty-but-harmless suspects
might fare better, as would the legitimacy and accuracy of the system itself.
This Article also argues that grand juries should be treated as evidenceweighing bodies, rather than prosecutorial rubber stamps, to increase citizen
participation in our increasingly opaque and bureaucratic system of justice; to
test the veracity and credibility of eyewitnesses; and to check prosecutorial and
law enforcement overreach.17
Perhaps most surprisingly, a more thorough precharge process may better
allocate scare resources. Prosecutors would be forced to make hard decisions
before pursuing cases. This might weed out factually or normatively innocent
suspects before such people are incarcerated.18 More accurate process could
reduce incarceration costs and reduce lawsuits from exonerated individuals.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the importance of
precharge/preindictment decision making by prosecutors in a world of mass
plea bargaining. These charging decisions set the entire criminal justice process
in motion, with irreversible consequences for both defendants and the system.
Part II compares the type of process prosecutors tend to give ordinary suspects
with the type of process they tend give to police suspects, including thorough
investigation and full evidentiary presentations to well-informed grand juries.
Finally, Part III addresses the peril and the promise of prosecutorial process for
police. It addresses the systemic harms that flow from unequal process for
criminal justice insiders but imagines what would happen if, rather than strip the
police of this prosecutorial process, we instead insist that all suspects get this
kind of precharge/preindictment treatment. To the extent that such a proposal
seems administratively and economically radical, I argue that we must be
thinking about the volume of criminal defendants that make such process
Wasserman, Prosecuting Police—The Role of the Grand-Jury Pool, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 4, 2014, 5:41
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/12/prosecuting-police-the-role-of-the-grand-jurypool.html (critiquing use of the grand jury in Ferguson, Missouri).
16. See Davis, supra note 10, at 18.
17. See infra Section III.B.
18. See infra Section III.B.
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infeasible, rather than reflexively justifying the status quo through references to
resource constraints.
There is a wide-ranging and timely scholarly discussion occurring about the
best way to regulate the police.19 But, within this conversation, there should
also be room for a comparison of the way prosecutors exercise their procedural
discretion when police are suspects with the way most other criminal suspects
are treated. This examination yields some important and counterintuitive conclusions about how we might reform our overly harsh and economically overburdened criminal justice system.
I. CHARGING DECISIONS IN AN AGE OF MASS PLEA BARGAINING
Legal scholarship regarding prosecutorial discretion almost uniformly laments or proposes cabining prosecutors.20 It also tends to focus heavily on what
happens after charges have been filed or indictments secured.21 In an era of
mass plea bargaining, our focus should shift to the discretionary decision
making a prosecutor must do before a suspect becomes a defendant through the
formal filing of criminal charges.22 Although charging decisions are made with

19. For recent scholarship examining the noncriminal laws that regulate police, see, e.g., Seth W.
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179 (2014); Seth W. Stoughton,
Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847 (2014); for how lawsuits can regulate police, see Harmon, supra
note 13; Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014); for who should be
tasked with prosecuting the police, see Levine, supra note 12; for scholarship arguing for more
prosecutions of less-visible police crimes, see I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83
IND. L.J. 835, 873 (2008); and for scholarship urging preemptive reform, see David M. Jaros,
Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2014).
20. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) (separation of powers is not a check on discretion); Donald A. Dripps,
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.
1155, 1161 (2005) (discretion and overcriminalization); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective
Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605 (1998) (problems with
selective prosecutions); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 648–49 (2004) (bad consequences of using informants); Nirej Sekhon,
The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014) (agency costs of discretion). But
see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 369,
370–71 (2010) (positive features of discretion).
21. See supra notes 6–10.
22. Depending on the jurisdiction and the severity of a crime, charges are either decided on and filed
by a prosecutor, or presented to a grand jury or judge who must determine that there is probable cause
to go forward with the case. Such a decision by a grand jury is known as an indictment. Most
misdemeanors are not required to be presented to a grand jury in any state. See Bowers, supra 11, at
1713. For felonies, there is a split among states. The states that do not require indictments for felony
charges, also known as “information states,” are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:7 n.1.1, Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2014). States that require indictments for most felony prosecutions are
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at n.2.
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almost no process and grand juries rarely question such decisions, a wide range
of evidence-testing processes are available for prosecutors to use at their
discretion. The availability of precharge process—investigation, witness interviews, conversations with defendants, and rigorous evidence testing at the grand
jury stage—shows that prosecutorial discretion need not only tend toward the
harshness that it has come to symbolize.23 Instead, prosecutors have an underutilized and undertheorized opportunity to weed out weak and relatively unimportant cases before a defendant, and society, must bear the costs of prosecution,
incarceration, collateral consequences, and, in some cases, exoneration.
The popular and systemic checks that historically limited prosecutorial
power—grand juries, petit juries, evidentiary review by trial judges, and review
by appellate judges—have all but disappeared in the age of mass arrests and
plea bargaining.24 In the past, lawmaking and enforcement were a more localized and public affair.25 As Stephanos Bibas writes, the “local community . . . literally saw justice done,” through public trials with local citizen
juries.26 If prosecutors brought too many or too harsh charges, there were
several citizen-based mechanisms for checking them. Similarly, the credibility
of the police and other witnesses could be checked by a jury at trial.27 More
trials also meant more opportunity for judicial review at the trial and appellate
stage.28
Grand juries, the citizen-bodies tasked with determining whether a prosecutor
has probable cause to go forward with charges against a criminal suspect, also
used to be a more active and participatory institution. Historically, these bodies
served to ensure that charges were not personal vendettas by politicians, and

23. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA
212–21 (2003) (arguing that prosecutors overcharge and punish defendants for exercising trial rights);
H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the Justice System, 61
CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 83–84 (2011) (arguing that prosecutors coerce defendants to plead through
overcharging); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461,
463 (2009) (noting “ample examples of ‘pretextual’ prosecutions on extraneous charges when prosecutors believe the accused individuals are inherently evil”).
24. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
25. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xviii (2012) (“Criminal justice used to
be individualized, moral, transparent, and participatory . . . .”). Of course, as Bibas notes, the older
model of criminal justice was not better—in fact, in many ways it was rife with far more problems,
including overt racism, brutality, and corrupt politicians. See id. at xx.
26. Id. at xix.
27. David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 457
(1999) (noting that juries are competent to assess the credibility of police witnesses).
28. Nancy J. King, Regulating Settlement: What Is Left of the Rule of Law in the Criminal Process?,
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 389, 391 (2007) (finding that “in a random sample of 971 written plea agreements
submitted to the United States Sentencing Commission between October 2003 and June 2004, 63%
contained express waivers of the right to review past and future error; in some districts virtually every
plea agreement contained such a waiver . . . . These waivers have been recognized in state cases as
well.”).
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they used their broad power to vigorously interview witnesses.29 They also
tended to more actively decline charges, whether because evidence was thin or
because the prosecution defied the public’s sense of morality.30 In fact, “traditionally, . . . the grand jury was seen as the major bar to prosecutorial overreaching.”31
Today, however, trials have all but disappeared,32 and grand juries have
become veritable rubber stamps on a prosecutor’s decision to charge as many
and as severe charges as she wants.33 At the same time, because so much
criminal law is decided through plea bargaining, how a suspect is charged
matters far more. Prosecutors are much less likely to discover weak spots in
their cases, and defendants lose out on the protections afforded them by the
Constitution, either through pretrial procedure such as suppression hearings,
cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses, or appellate review.34
Despite the magnitude of an initial decision to charge or indict, these
decisions are often made reflexively, with no investigation and no accountability
mechanism.35 These charging decisions are also among the most opaque made
by any actor in the legal system.36 Prosecutors rarely have to justify their
decisions to charge or not to charge, what evidence they present to a grand jury,
or what process they use to make these decisions. Yet because approximately
ninety percent of cases end in a plea bargain,37 and because so many suspects
are accused only of low-level charges, where pleading guilty is less onerous
than fighting the charges,38 the decision to charge a suspect is often tantamount
29. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2343 (2008)
(“The early colonial grand juries worked independently and proactively, at least in part because local
government was relatively limited with few or no police resources to investigate accusations.”).
30. See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
319, 323 (2012) (“[T]he grand jury historically served (and, in sub-rosa fashion, continues to serve) as a
normative check, notwithstanding its ostensible function as a probable-cause screen.”); Ric Simmons,
Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002) (“Although the grand juries’ actions have been based on ever-shifting
political grounds rather than immutable legal standards, in each case their decision was popular in the
community and served to enhance the grand jury’s reputation as a protector of liberty.”).
31. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 106 (2013).
32. See LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1
(2011), http://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf (“While there are no
exact estimates of the proportion of cases that are resolved through plea bargaining, scholars estimate
that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases are resolved through this process.”).
33. See infra Section II.A.
34. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969) (observing that entry of a guilty plea
involves waiver of the right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
one’s accusers).
35. See generally Bowers, supra note 11.
36. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 580
(2001) (“[P]olice and prosecutors are necessarily in the business of rough pre-adjudication screening, of
separating the probably guilty from the probably innocent. That screening is bound to be unreviewable,
or close to it.”).
37. See DEVERS, supra note 32, at 1.
38. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2468 (2004) (“[D]etained defendants strike bargains for time served instead of awaiting their day in
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to a conviction.39
Regardless of whether a charging decision “inexorably” leads to a guilty
plea,40 the decision to charge initiates a process through which a criminal
suspect becomes a defendant and is subject to pre-plea or preconviction loss of
liberty, lifetime stigma, and collateral consequences that may be more onerous
than the direct punishment.41 Because a criminal charge or indictment is a
serious harm to a defendant in and of itself, the ability of a prosecutor to
subsequently reduce charges or decide not to prosecute after formal charges are
filed does not lessen the importance of this initial, pro forma, and rarely
reviewed decision.42
Charging decisions may also lead to a host of administrative costs that must
be borne by the public. Many criminal defendants must be represented by an
attorney once they are charged.43 Society must fund an indigent defendant’s
stay in a local jail, assuming she cannot make the money bail set by a judge,44
and then foot the bill for incarceration or monitoring once she is sentenced.45
Thus, although it may be counterintuitive, reallocating resources to these precharge/indictment decisions might actually relieve some of the financial outlay
society must make to support mass incarceration. It might also help solve some
court. Plea bargaining, then, often happens in the shadow not of trial but of bail decisions.”); Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2008) (“[T]he pretrial process is
painful. Punishment does not begin with sentence. Many defendants—even the innocent—do not
welcome a process that frequently constitutes most, if not all, of the punishment they will face.”);
Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1237, 1238 (2008) (“The odds of fighting and winning a criminal case at trial have never been smaller,
a fact attested to by the ever-shrinking number of defendants who successfully contest charges at
trial.”).
39. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1709 (“A charge leads almost inevitably and quickly to some
adjudication of guilt.”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2012).
40. Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1328.
41. See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for
Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2012) (“As a result of recent trends in immigration law and
policy, virtually any interaction with the criminal justice system leaves noncitizens, regardless of their
lawful or unlawful status, at a very real risk of deportation or other negative immigration penalties.”).
42. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical
Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2004) (“A prosecutor’s decision to
proceed with, or to forgo, a criminal prosecution . . . not only has tremendous consequences for the
individual defendant, but also for his family, business associates, and his community.”).
43. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (noting that the right to an attorney
attaches once “a prosecution is commenced, that is, ‘at or after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment’” (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984))).
44. Douglas L. Colbert, When the Cheering (for Gideon) Stops: The Defense Bar and Representation at Initial Bail Hearings, 36 CHAMPION 10, 10 (2012) (“Those who cannot afford bail, including
many charged with nonviolent crimes, will remain in jail between two and 70 days, waiting for their
assigned lawyer’s advocacy before a judicial officer. Taxpayers are left to pay the high cost of
incarceration before trial.”).
45. See JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY & RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF
INCARCERATION 2 (2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf (“The
financial costs of our corrections policies are staggering. In 2008, federal, state, and local governments
spent about $75 billion on corrections . . . .”).
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of the most vexing problems that have arisen during the incarceration binge of
the last several decades. For one thing, precharge investigation or grand jury
process might uncover falsely accused suspects, saving them the torture of false
accusation and potential punishment and society the cost of their incarceration
and the civil suits they file once exonerated.46 For another, they might require
prosecutors to recognize how often they are charging poor, African-American
defendants with low-level crimes. In the aggregate, these choices cost society
undue sums of money and ensure that a disproportionate number of individuals
of a particular race are incarcerated and monitored for crimes often committed
in roughly equal numbers by whites and African-Americans.47
Precharge process is rarely considered as a potential option in the majority of
criminal cases.48 Yet prosecutors actually have a wide range of potential process
that they could engage in before making a charging decision. In any given case,
they can decide what evidence to gather, what credibility to give statements
from suspects, victims, witnesses, and police, and how much evidence they
present to a grand jury in those states that require an indictment to proceed with
certain charges.49 Prosecutors’ decisions not to allocate time or resources to
such factors, either precharge or preindictment, is taken as a given in the vast
majority of cases. Engaging in this type of rigorous review for so many suspects
seems impossible given caseloads and budget constraints.50 And because the
standard to charge is only probable cause, a police officer’s or eyewitness’s
statement is usually enough to convince a prosecutor to go forward.51
But, as we have seen in the past year, when the police are the suspects, the
usual charge and indictment process appears to unravel. This can be seen in the
unusually detailed presentation of evidence to the grand jury in the choking

46. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 967 (2004)
(discussing millions spent on incarcerating and compensating innocent people).
47. For instance, whites and African-Americans use drugs at approximately the same rates, while
whites sell drugs at a higher rate than African-Americans. Yet African-Americans are two-to-three times
more likely to be arrested for sale or possession. See Jonathan Rothwell, How the War on Drugs
Damages Black Social Mobility, BROOKINGS (Sept. 30, 2014, 11:37 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
social-mobility-memos/posts/2014/09/30-war-on-drugs-black-social-mobility-rothwell; see also D. Marvin Jones, “He’s a Black Male . . . Something Is Wrong with Him!” The Role of Race in the Stand Your
Ground Debate, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2014) (“Blacks abuse cocaine at rates statistically
indistinguishable from the rates of abuse by whites. There is no meaningful difference. However, the
perception by police, prosecutors and judges is obviously very different. While blacks and whites use
drugs at statistically identical rates, 68% of those arrested for drugs, and 90% of those imprisoned for
drugs are black.”).
48. Bowers, supra note 11, at 1710 (noting that a prosecutor may be more inclined to dismiss a case
postcharge).
49. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 25 (2007)
(“[B]ecause the prosecutor maintains unilateral control over the grand jury, in most cases [it] is simply
a tool of the prosecutor . . . .”).
50. Cf. Wright & Miller, supra note 11, at 34 (arguing that prosecutors should “invest serious
resources in early evaluation of cases”).
51. Bowers, supra note 11, at 1716 (explaining that prosecutors charge more often in cases where
police observation is the only evidence).
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death of Eric Garner at the hands of police in Staten Island, New York, which
lead to no indictment.52 It is also apparent in the investigation into the police
shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, and the grand jury’s
decision not to indict there.53 It took the prosecutor more than a year to present
the case to a grand jury,54 and before doing so, three commissioned independent
reports were released discussing the facts of the shooting and concluding that
the officers had not committed criminal acts.55 This seemingly extraordinary
process for police suspects, before they formally become defendants through
charge or indictment, has been maligned by the public, the legal community,
and scholars. It has been seen as a way for prosecutors to exculpate criminal
suspects whom they do not want to prosecute.56
As I argue here, however, prosecutors’ use of their discretionary procedural
power, whether leading to charges or not, actually becomes more structurally
sound in police-suspect cases. For a variety of reasons, prosecutors use their full
arsenal of procedural discretion when a police-suspect’s liberty and reputation is
on the line: they conduct thorough precharge investigations, credit an officersuspect’s version of events, and either exercise their option to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury or, in many cases, decline to charge altogether.57
Public scrutiny also tends to motivate prosecutors to explain their otherwise
secret decision making58 and is a valuable tool for those looking to understand
the discretionary “black box” in which prosecutors operate.59
The importance of an initial charge or indictment cannot be overstated. Thus,
a comparison of the type of process police receive before formal charges are
initiated and the process most other suspects receive deserves further examination. Below, I describe two ways in which prosecutors tend to give police

52. Howard M. Wasserman, Epilogue: Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 845,
846 (2015) (“[A] New York grand jury declined to indict New York City police officer Daniel Pantaleo
in the death of Eric Garner during an arrest for selling loose cigarettes.”).
53. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice
Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-policeshootiing-cleveland.html?_r⫽0.
54. Id. (noting that the shooting took place in November 2014).
55. Press Release, Cuyahoga Cty. Office of the Prosecutor, Statement from Cuyahoga County
Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty on the Release of Three Additional Reports Regarding the Death of
Tamir Rice (Oct. 10, 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/2015-10-10-pr-statement-onreports.aspx [hereinafter Statement from Cuyahoga County].
56. See supra note 15.
57. See supra note 15.
58. For instance, Robert McCullough held a press conference after a grand jury declined to charge
Darren Wilson in which he explained the process by which the jury made its decision. Ferguson,
Missouri Grand Jury Decision Announcement, C-SPAN (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.c-span.org/video/
?322925-1/ferguson-missouri-grand-jury-decision-announcement. State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby held
a press conference when she decided to press charges against six officers accused in the killing of
Baltimore teen Freddie Gray. Watch: Baltimore’s State’s Attorney Announces Findings of Freddie Gray
Investigation, MEDIAITE (May 1, 2015, 10:51 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/tv/watch-live-baltimoresstates-attorney-holds-briefing-on-freddie-gray/.
59. See generally Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125 (2008).
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suspects far more precharge process than other suspects: investigation into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case and rigorous evidentiary presentations to grand juries.
II. COMPARING PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURES FOR MOST SUSPECTS AND THE POLICE
In our current criminal justice climate, most suspects are charged or indicted
with little process, despite the vast array of investigative and evidence-testing
mechanisms at prosecutors’ disposal. In this Part, I compare this reflexive
charging of most suspects with the thorough precharge process given to many
police suspects.
A. PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURE FOR MOST SUSPECTS

Prosecutors rarely use their full procedural arsenal for the majority of suspects. Based only on an arrest and the statement of a law enforcement officer,
they routinely find what passes for probable cause to charge a suspect.60
Prosecutors also engage in the potentially unethical61 but widely accepted
practice of overcharging, both horizontally—in the form of multiple different
charges arising out of the same offense—and vertically—charging a suspect
with more serious crimes than the evidence bears out. Prosecutors then use
these extra charges as bargaining chips during plea negotiations.62
The prosecutor–police relationship in charging decisions against ordinary
suspects has caused concern among criminal justice scholars for several reasons. Prosecutors and police team up to pressure potential misdemeanants to
confess and plead guilty.63 Prosecutors do not check their law enforcement
partners by refusing to pursue cases where police have violated a suspect’s
constitutional rights.64 And prosecutors use their vast charging power to ratchet
60. See supra note 39.
61. See Andrew D. Leipold, Prosecutorial Charging Practices and Grand Jury Screening: Some
Empirical Observations, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 195, 199 (Roger
Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) (arguing that overcharging is “ethically questionable” even if it does not
violate a specific ethics rule).
62. See Graham, supra note 11, at 704–05 (“Thus, in both vertical and horizontal overcharging, the
prosecutor originally alleges a charge or charges that she subjectively does not want to pursue to
conviction, or is at least indifferent about prosecuting. Instead, the extraneous or unduly severe
allegations are put forward to incentivize the defendant to plead guilty to another charge or charges.”).
63. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1660 (“Prosecutors adopt near-categorical charging strategies in
petty cases, because petty charges provide cover to the police for consummated arrests and institutional
advantages to prosecutors in the form of cheap and expeditious plea convictions.”); Natapoff, supra
note 39, at 1328 (“Prosecutors fail to screen and instead charge arrestees based solely on allegations in
police reports.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 59 (1991) (“Through the police and grand jury, [the
prosecutor] monopolizes the ability to coerce testimony and obtain cooperation in the investigation of
crimes.”).
64. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1701 (“Just as police are inclined to make arrests to provide cover
for searches, prosecutors are inclined to file charges to provide cover for police arrests.”); Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1361–62 (1997) (noting that prosecutors often do not speak to officers in person,
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up the amount and severity of charges a suspect faces to induce a swift and sure
resolution of guilt without a trial and without checking the evidence presented
by police.65
In a world of scarce resources, prosecutors often use their discretion to charge
cases they know they can win, rather than cases that represent the most
problematic behavior (which often require greater outlay of resources) or even
cases where a suspect is most likely guilty.66 This mentality flows from a
variety of professional and political incentives.67 Line prosecutors are often
promoted due to their success at obtaining convictions,68 and district attorneys
run for reelection on their “tough on crime” stance.69 Although it is unlikely that
any prosecutor believes that it is the right substantive outcome, the economic
and political reality is that convicting an innocent, or guilty-but-harmless,
suspect hurts a prosecutor far less than having a high acquittal rate or declining

which makes it harder to assess credibility before filing charges); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police:
The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 349–50 (2005) (same).
65. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The plea bargaining
system] presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense . . . .”); Natapoff, supra note 39,
at 1331 (“A growing literature indicates that urban police routinely arrest people for reasons other than
probable cause, that high-volume arrest policies such as zero tolerance and order maintenance create a
substantial risk of evidentiarily weak arrests, that mechanisms for checking whether arrests are based
on probable cause are sporadic, and finally that, if those mechanisms do kick in, police sometimes lie
about whether there was sufficient evidence for an arrest.”).
66. See Paul Butler, How Can You Prosecute Those People?, in HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE
PEOPLE? 15, 19 (Abbe Smith & Monroe H. Freedman eds., 2013) (“[T]he prosecutor’s ‘knowledge’ of
guilt is mainly secondary and not well-informed.”); Stephanos Bibas, Sacrificing Quantity for Quality:
Better Focusing Prosecutors’ Scarce Resources, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 138, 138 (2011)
(“Indeed, individual prosecutors often reactively prosecute the cases that come before them, instead of
proactively setting priorities and focusing on system-wide tradeoffs.”); Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1316
(“Misdemeanants routinely plead to low-level crimes for which there is little or no evidence, without
assistance of counsel or any other meaningful adversarial process. In some cases, defendants are
demonstrably innocent. In others, the process is so lax that we cannot say with any certainty whether
defendants are guilty or not.”).
67. See Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 171, 173 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) (“Charging decisions
are routinely influenced . . . by any number of factors such as law enforcement priorities, the prosecutor’s assessment of the defendant’s likelihood of reoffending . . . and whether the case will advance the
prosecutor’s career.”).
68. See DAVIS, supra note 49, at 34 (noting that an assistant prosecutor who did not secure
convictions “would not be promoted or otherwise advance in [an elected district attorney’s office]”);
Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the
Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 45 (2009) (“[A] ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric often resonates
with the public, an important consideration given that nearly all state and local district attorneys gain
their positions through public elections.”); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 331 (2002) (“[P]rosecutors use sensible measures to gauge their
effectiveness at fulfilling [their crime-reduction] mandate. First, they often focus on conviction rates.”).
69. See BIBAS, supra note 25, at 43 (“Because [district attorneys] face electoral pressure to maximize
convictions, they push their unelected subordinates to increase conviction rates.”); DAVIS, supra note 49,
at 34.
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to prosecute a suspect who may later commit a more serious crime.70 Prosecutors may also worry about using their resources to investigate a criminal
accusation precharge, particularly if it ends in a declination. They leave that to
their police partners.71
This is particularly true in low-level cases, such as trespassing or possession
of small amounts of drugs, where prosecutors’ decisions will almost never be
scrutinized and where a defendant will have every incentive to plead guilty for
leniency rather than waiting, often in jail, for a full investigation or any testing
of the proof against her.72 In fact, the lowest-level cases are often subject to the
least amount of review from prosecutors. Alexandra Natapoff has shown that
this may lead to the conviction of many innocent defendants.73 Josh Bowers has
posited that prosecutors use their “equitable discretion”—their ability to decline
charges in cases where the evidence may be present but the harm to society
extremely slight—least in low-level, victimless cases where society would
reasonably want them to use it most.74
In comparison to low-level criminal charges, prosecutors appear to review
more serious allegations of criminal actions with more care. In serious felony
cases such as homicide or assault crimes, prosecutors do more before they
charge: reviewing evidence, speaking to witnesses, and declining to charge
where there appears to be little probable cause.75 Yet, it is still rare for a suspect
accused even of a serious felony to have her case dismissed precharge or
preindictment.76 Moreover, even in states where a grand jury is required to
indict for felony charges,77 prosecutors present a barebones and extremely
skewed version of the facts in order to ensure that the charges they want

70. See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 534 (“[P]rosecutors have a substantial incentive to win the cases
they bring. One piece of evidence for this fairly obvious proposition is the frequency with which
elected prosecutors cite conviction rates in their campaigns.”); Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the
Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 260, 262 (2009) (“Police and prosecutors play averages
by arresting and charging the usual recidivist suspects . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 630 (2014) (“[P]olice practices mediate criminal events and arrests. This is especially true of
misdemeanors. The police can find as many [misdemeanors] . . . as they devote the time and resources
to find.”).
72. Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1513, 1515 (2013) (“Defendants who are required to post bail that they cannot afford may end up
pleading guilty to avoid waiting in jail.”).
73. See generally Natapoff, supra note 39.
74. See generally Bowers, supra note 11.
75. See Bowers, supra note 11, at 1715 (“[I]f there are reasons—administrative, legal, or equitable—
to forego prosecution [in serious criminal cases], prosecutors are likelier to perceive and act upon the
relevant considerations. Prosecutors are motivated to pay attention, because little missteps on big
charges run risks of creating big subsequent adjudicatory and political headaches.”).
76. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 45–46 (1997) (noting that one-fifth of felony arrests are declined).
77. Simmons, supra note 30, at 19 (“Today, the grand jury requirement remains in only nineteen
states. In the other jurisdictions, prosecutors usually proceed by filing an information with the court and
then submitting the case to a preliminary hearing conducted by a judge or magistrate.” (footnote
omitted)).
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become indictments.78
When prosecutors must present cases to a grand jury, the proceedings almost
always result in the prosecutor getting indictments for all the charges she seeks
to bring.79 The grand jury is maligned for its inability to perform its screening
function of checking prosecutors and witnesses before an indictment is rendered.80 The notion that a grand jury will find probable cause to indict “a ham
sandwich,” however, puts the onus of this lack of functionality on the wrong
group.81 Structurally, a grand jury has all the capacity that a petit jury has to
comprehend and weigh evidence.82 And, although probable cause is a low
standard, it is not no standard. The reason that grand juries indict in such an
overwhelming number of cases is due, at least in far larger share than credit is
given, to the fact that they hear only one curated and unchallenged version of
events.83
Grand jury proceedings are almost always kept secret. Thus, it is hard to
illustrate how much prosecutors dominate and control every aspect of these
proceedings. But the rules governing the grand jury make it relatively plain that
unless a prosecutor wants the grand jury to question her case, it won’t. Federal
law requires no presentation of exculpatory evidence to grand juries. Although
states’ rules vary, most require only “substantial” exculpation to be presented.84

78. See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of
the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1268 (2006) (“[A] defendant charged by the grand jury
receives . . . a secret, one-sided review process administered by the prosecutor.”); Simmons, supra note
30, at 27 (“[T]here is no real check on the quantity or quality of the evidence that a federal prosecutor
needs to present to a grand jury.”).
79. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A Proposed Addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor’s Legal Instructions to the Grand Jury, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1443, 1443 (2001) (“[T]he grand jury has been widely criticized for acting as a ‘rubber stamp’ for
the prosecutor, thereby failing to fulfill its screening function.”).
80. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 703, 705–06 (2008) (describing critiques of the grand jury as a body that does just what the
prosecutor requests).
81. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 929 (2006) (“In theory, citizens run grand juries, but in practice they are dominated by prosecutors
and would ‘indict a ham sandwich’ if prosecutors asked them to do so.”).
82. See Fairfax, Jr., supra note 80, at 706 (arguing that modern conception of the grand jury misses
its power to check prosecutors and ensure legitimacy); Washburn, supra note 29, at 2337 (same).
83. See Susan W. Brenner, Grand Jurors Speak, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE
GRAND JURY 25, 36 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011) (including an e-mail from grand juror noting
that “the system is slanted toward the prosecution . . . the professionals against the common folk”)
(alteration in original); R. Michael Cassidy, Toward A More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and
Enforcing the Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 361, 366
(2000) (arguing that states should prevent prosecutors from “distorting the evidence before the grand
jury by omitting evidence in their possession that substantially negates the defendant’s guilt”); Niki
Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13
(2004) (arguing that prosecutors are “affirmatively encourage[d] . . . to minimize the grand jury’s
consideration of the evidence”).
84. Some states do require exculpatory evidence to be presented to a grand jury. Most only require it
if “the exculpatory value is substantial,” but a few, such as Montana and California, have broader
requirements. State v. Hogan, 676 A.2d 533, 541 (N.J. 1996) [(discussing state practices); See also]
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This means rarely requiring witnesses who challenge the police’s or complainant’s version of events to testify. There is also no hearsay rule in the grand jury
room, which means that grand jurors often do not hear from live witnesses or
judge their credibility.85 Nor is a defense attorney allowed in the room.86 The
only time a defense attorney is permitted to attend a session is when her client
has a right to and elects to testify and then, only for that portion of the
presentation.87 She may not challenge questions put to her client by a prosecutor, should the client testify, including questions about unrelated but damning
past arrests and convictions.88 There is no judge in the room, nor will a judge
review a grand jury transcript unless a defendant mounts a specific challenge
later in the process.89
It is a crime for a grand juror to report on the proceedings she participates in,
so stories from actual grand jurors are rare.90 A Harper’s author, however was
willing to speak about the process he experienced while serving. In his rare
firsthand account, he wrote that prosecutors in the grand jury room are “singularly powerful narrators”: “[t]he number of times we refused to indict [in over
100 cases] could be counted on one finger. We were simply not expected to
dismiss charges.”91 When one juror asked how an officer could have deduced
while still inside her police car that two young robbery suspects were intoxi-

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992) (“[R]equiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory
as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury’s historical role, transforming it from an
accusatory to an adjudicatory body.”).
85. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 83, at 33–34 (noting that one grand juror related how a DEA agent
gave a summary of his interview with a witness rather than calling that witness to appear); Fairfax,
supra note 80, at 705 (noting that grand jurors “usually [hear evidence] in the form of unchallenged
hearsay testimony”); Simmons, supra note 30, at 21 (“[Because] grand jurors do not hear directly from
the key witnesses in a case, they are unable to effectively evaluate witness credibility. Far more critical,
allowing hearsay testimony results in streamlined, assembly-line presentations in which grand jurors
lose the incentive to evaluate the cases at all.”).
86. Fairfax, supra note 80, at 755; see also Brenner, supra note 83, at 36 (noting an e-mail from a
grand juror who was upset at “never hearing from an attorney for the accused”); Andrew D. Leipold,
Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 289 (1995)
(“[J]udges and defense counsel are not present at the hearings . . . .”).
87. Simmons, supra note 30, at 23 (“The overwhelming majority of states and the federal government do not give the defendant any right to testify on his own behalf.”).
88. See Fairfax, supra note 80, at 755 (“[E]videntiary restrictions do not limit the questions that a
prosecutor can ask a witness before a grand jury.”); Simmons, supra note 30, at 24 (“[A] defendant
faces so many disadvantages in the grand jury that the defendant is unlikely to perceive the proceeding
favorably no matter what the rules are.”).
89. Simmons, supra note 30, at 26–27 (noting that judges rarely review transcripts in the federal
system or most states). But see Discovery by a Criminal Defendant of His Own Grand-Jury Testimony,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 311 (1968) (“Even in the special case where all a defendant seeks is the record
of the testimony that he gave before the grand jury himself, tradition is on the side of non-disclosure.”).
90. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2), (7) (“Unless these rules provide otherwise . . . [a grand juror]
“must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury . . . . A knowing violation of Rule 6 . . . may
be punished as a contempt of court.”).
91. Gideon Lewis-Kraus, A Grand Juror Speaks: The Inside Story of How Prosecutors Always Get
Their Way, HARPER’S MAG., Mar. 2015, at 41, 43, http://harpers.org/archive/2015/03/a-grand-jurorspeaks/.
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cated, the prosecutor told him, “Those are the sorts of procedural questions that
will be addressed at trial.”92 In other words, according to this prosecutor, testing
the officer’s credibility was not part of the probable cause determination.
E-mails to Susan W. Brenner, a scholar who set up a grand jury information
website, confirm that prosecutors jealously guard what questions the grand jury
may pose to a witness.93 One federal grand juror wrote of a New Jersey practice
in which prosecutors excused witnesses before the jurors were permitted to ask
questions about their testimony.94 Then, the prosecutors would routinely spend
twenty minutes out of the room before bringing the witness back in front of the
grand jurors to answer their questions.95 In that juror’s opinion, the witnesses’
answers were “carefully rehearsed and parroted back” to the grand jurors.96
The way prosecutors use grand juries, when they must, is a choice, not a
mandate.97 The same is true for prosecutors’ decisions about the credibility of
police, witness statements, and the facts of an accusation, and whether and what
to charge. Powerful professional and political incentives box even the most
conscientious prosecutors into the role of competitive adversary. However, the
ethical mandate of a prosecutor to be a “minister of justice” should invoke more
thoughtful precharge or preindictment behavior.98 Such behavior has been on
display in recent police-suspect cases.
B. PROSECUTORIAL PROCEDURE FOR POLICE SUSPECTS

Police suspects have a number of inherent advantages that flow from their
position as insiders in the criminal justice system, particularly with regard to
their interactions with prosecutors and with each other.99 Because of their
sophistication as criminal justice insiders, police suspects are far less likely to
confess to a crime, speak to police without a lawyer, or fall prey to psychological interrogation tactics.100 Due to the well-known blue wall of silence, police
92. Id. at 44.
93. Brenner, supra note 83, at 28.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The prosecutorial curation of and control over grand juries is also a modern invention. For the
history of grand juries’ functions, see generally Suja A. Thomas, Blackstone’s Curse: The Fall of the
Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries and the Rise of the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary, and
the States, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1214 (2014); Kuckes, supra note 78, at 1302 (“[T]he power
to ‘nullify’ valid charges has been described by influential commentators as ‘arguably . . . the most
important attribute of grand jury review from the perspective of those who insisted that a grand jury
clause be included in the Bill of Rights.’”).
98. Zacharias, supra note 63, at 46 (“In civil litigation, the [professional responsibility codes]
presume that good outcomes result when lawyers represent clients aggressively. In criminal cases, the
codes do not rely as fully on competitive lawyering. They treat prosecutors as advocates, but also as
‘ministers’ having an ethical duty to ‘do justice.’” (footnote omitted)).
99. Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author); see
generally BIBAS, supra note 25 (laying out the problematic bureaucratic and insider-driven criminal
justice system).
100. See generally Levine, supra note 99.
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officers are far less likely to inculpate a fellow officer when he is a suspect.101
Nor are fellow police likely to report an officer’s criminal behavior, meaning
that much police criminality goes completely unpunished.102
One might imagine that the natural response from prosecutors would be to
use their discretion to ensure charges against officers when their alleged criminal activity comes to light, knowing, as they surely do, that police behavior
must be particularly egregious in order for anyone to take note.103 But the
opposite appears to be true; police are rarely charged for criminal behavior that
most know is commonplace.104 This is truer for lower-level police criminality
than it is for more high-profile brutality cases. For instance, police lie under
oath so often that a term, “testilying” has been coined for the practice.105 Yet, as
one author wrote, an officer is more likely to get “struck by lightning” than
charged with perjury.106
In more high-stakes cases, wherein prosecutors must consider criminal charges
against police suspects, either because of their own belief that a crime may have
occurred or because of public scrutiny, something different from the usual
robotic charge decision occurs. Prosecutors investigate, gather evidence, both
inculpatory and exculpatory, and when they do not decline charges on their
own, they often present a full case to a grand jury.107
Prosecutors decline to charge officers who kill (often unarmed) suspects at an
extremely high rate. Although recordkeeping by the federal government has
been extremely poor,108 academics, citizens, and media outlets have begun their
own collection of reports. A thorough analysis by the Washington Post and

101. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
103. Capers, supra note 19, at 837 (“[T]he zone of law enforcement . . . is . . . a zone of underenforcement. Except in the most egregious cases—those involving brutality or death, for example—law
enforcement officers can engage in otherwise sanctionable and criminal behavior usually without fear
of consequences.” (footnote omitted)).
104. As I note in a forthcoming article, prosecutors have an inherent conflict when they are tasked
with investigating and charging their law enforcement partners—personal, professional, and political
obstacles infect decision making at every stage of such cases. See Levine, supra note 12.
105. See Capers, supra note 19, at 870 (“[Police] lies are so pervasive that even former prosecutors
have described them as ‘commonplace’ and ‘prevalent.’ Surveyed prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges believed perjury was present in approximately twenty percent of all cases.” (footnote omitted));
see generally Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1037 (1996).
106. Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons
to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 211 (2000) (citing Ruben Castaneda, Police Officer
Perjury Not Rare, Observers Say; Indictment May Be a First in Pr. George’s, WASH. POST, Feb. 17,
1999, at Bl).
107. A salient example of this process is the three reports that have been filed in the Tamir Rice
shooting in Ohio. These reports preceded the prosecutor’s presentation to the grand jury in that case.
See Statement from Cuyahoga County, supra note 55; see also supra notes 92–104.
108. Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-ayear-no-one-knows/ (quoting a Department of Justice statistician stating that FBI shooting data has
“significant limitations in terms of coverage and reliability”).
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researchers at Bowling Green State University uncovered that, out of thousands
of fatal shootings by law enforcement officers since 2005, only fifty-four had
been charged or indicted.109 According to the study, in the majority of charged
cases, prosecutors had evidence of “a victim shot in the back, a video recording
of the incident, incriminating testimony from other officers or allegations of a
coverup.”110 As one of the researchers noted, “[t]o charge an officer in a fatal
shooting, it takes something so egregious, so over the top that it cannot be
explained in any rational way.”111
The idea that something egregious must be found to even consider charging
an officer with a fatal crime illustrates the caution with which prosecutors
proceed when it comes to their law enforcement partners. This is also elucidated
by the thorough investigations done by prosecutors before deciding whether to
charge an officer involved in a civilian killing. For instance, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office publishes its decisions to decline to prosecute
officers for killing suspects.112 As of April 2016, it had not charged a single
officer in the hundreds of police killings since 2000.113 These decision memos
show the systematic and careful use of procedural discretion that goes into such cases.
For instance, a video from a 2013 shooting in Gardena, California, in which
prosecutors declined to charge officers for killing an unarmed man, was only
recently released by order of a U.S. district court judge, over the strenuous
objections of lawyers for Gardena and the officers.114 But the prosecutors’ letter
declining to charge has been public since July 2014.115 The letter cites interviews with all four officers involved in the incident as well as three civilian
witnesses: two were with the decedent and one was a witness to a bicycle theft
that triggered the incident.116 A district attorney and investigator were given a
“walk-through” of the scene.117 The letter also reports on three different videos
from officers’ dash-cams,118 and an independent investigation by a retired

109. Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted/.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Bowling Green State University criminologist Philip M. Stinson).
112. Although I will focus on Los Angeles, other jurisdictions have similar investigatory policies
when it comes to police fatalities. See, e.g., Decision Memos, CLARK CTY. NEV. DIST. ATTY’S OFF.,
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/district_attorney/Pages/DecisionMemos.aspx (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
113. Matt Ferner, Los Angeles Law Enforcement Officers Kill About One Person a Week, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 16, 2014, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/16/nearly-600-people-have-be_
n_5831042.html (noting that “nearly 600” people were killed by police since 2000).
114. Brittny Mejia et al., This is the Shooting Video Gardena Police Didn’t Want You to See, L.A.
TIMES (July 15, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-gardena-officer-shooting20150714-story.html.
115. Letter from Jackie Lacey, Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Duane Harris,
Captain, Homicide Bureau, L.A. Cty. Sherriff’s Dep’t (July 2, 2014), http://documents.latimes.com/damemo-gardena-police-shooting-unarmed-men-captured-video/.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 10–11.
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LAPD captain.119 It then goes through a legal analysis of applicable case law
and concludes with several paragraphs applying the legal standard to the
facts.120
The publication of the video has led some to claim that it shows unequivocally the unjustified shooting of an unarmed, nondangerous, and innocent
suspect.121 Assuming that the video corroborates the district attorney’s report,
however, the detailed and thorough investigation that produced such a report
illustrates the tremendous precharge procedural advantages police officers receive. The thorough and lengthy review of factual evidence and legal analysis
would surprise an attorney defending a civilian charged with a violent crime,
particularly in a case where identity was not in question.122 Several other letters
from the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office show similar investigative
rigor.123
Police suspects receive thorough process charges are brought against officers
too, as shown by the recent charges in Freddie Gray’s death from a spinal cord
injury on a “rough ride” in a Baltimore police van.124 Although many praised
State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby for her quick resolution to charge six officers,
she made clear that the charges were the product of a “thorough” and “independent” investigation, with her team working “around the clock” to interview
witnesses, watch video footage of Gray’s arrest and videotaped statements to
police, review Gray’s medical records, and survey the police van’s route.125 In
119. Id. at 12–13.
120. Id. at 13–14.
121. See, e.g., Rory Carroll, Ricardo Diaz Zeferino: Videos of Police Shooting Unarmed Man in
Bike Theft Go Public, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 11:55 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
jul/15/ricardo-diaz-zeferino-video-of-shooting-by-los-angeles-police-made-public (quoting attorney who
says shooting was clearly a “criminal act”).
122. See Todd Oppenheim, Opinion, Another Baltimore Injustice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015),
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/opinion/another-baltimore-injustice.html?smid⫽tw-share&referer⫽
(discussing remarkably different treatment at all stages of process for police officers accused in Gray’s
death compared to other Baltimore defendants); cf. Kate Levine, supra note 99 (discussing an entire
layer of procedural protection afforded only to police during interrogation).
123. See, e.g., Letter from Jackie Lacey, Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, to Phillip
L. Sanchez, Chief, Pasadena Police Dep’t (Dec. 17, 2012), http://extras.mnginteractive.com/live/media/
site205/2012/1217/20121217_013713_JSID_File_12-0207.pdf (finding no charges in shooting of unarmed man suspected in armed robbery); Letter from Steve Cooley, Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to Rick Esteves, Chief, Downey Police Dep’t (Oct. 23, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/
three/kabc/kabc/downey-ois-da-letter-2.pdf (finding no charges in killing of man mistakenly identified
as robbery suspect who fled from police); Letter from Steve Cooley, Dist. Attorney, L.A. Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, to James Voge, Captain, Force Investigation Div., L.A. Police Dep’t (Dec. 5, 2005),
http://mdcbowen.org/cobb/archives/garciaois.pdf (finding no charges filed in a case where police shot
and killed a thirteen-year-old auto-theft suspect).
124. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez, Freddie Gray’s Injury and the Police ‘Rough Ride,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/freddie-grays-injury-and-the-police-rough-ride.
html. This should counter the suggestion that prosecutors only do thorough precharge investigation
when they are looking to exculpate law enforcement.
125. See Watch: Baltimore Prosecutor Charges Six Police Officers, Calls Freddie Gray’s Death a
“Homicide,” DEMOCRACY NOW (May 1, 2015), http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2015/5/1/watch_
baltimore_prosecutor_charges_six_police.
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other words, the thoroughness of the investigation is what separates policesuspect cases from other cases—not whether the investigation results in charges
or an indictment.
Similarly, a tremendous amount of resources and investigation is put into
grand jury presentations for police suspects. St. Louis County Prosecuting
Attorney Robert McCullough came under fire for his handling of the shooting
death of teenager Michael Brown by Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson,
Missouri.126 In particular, much scrutiny was devoted to the grand jury process,
where the jurors heard dozens of witnesses over weeks of testimony.127 The
published transcripts showed a host of differences from the normal picture of a
modern grand jury hearing. McCulloch addressed the jury, letting them know
they would hear “every statement” and “every bit of evidence” and that the
proceeding would be “like a trial.”128 The jury heard sixty-two witnesses,
including Darren Wilson and Dorian Johnson, who was with Michael Brown
when the shooting occurred.129 Jurors were also able to compare testimony with
dozens of interviews conducted by police after the shooting; forensic and crime
scene reports; photographs of the crime scene; Wilson’s car, gun, and clothing;
and close-ups of Wilson’s face, as he alleged he had been struck several times
by Brown.130 Only after this “trial” did the jury decide not to indict.
McCulloch’s decision to present a full case to the grand jury is not uncommon in police cases.131 Although a judge has so far refused to release the
transcripts in the choking death of Eric Garner, we know that the suspect–
officer spoke to the jurors for two hours.132 The jury also heard from forty-nine
other witnesses.133 There are no nationwide statistics for how often prosecutors
present such full evidence to grand juries, but as the New York Times noted,
“most prosecutors impanel a special grand jury to investigate police-related
deaths” and therefore “insulate themselves from the final decision, while appearing to fulfill the public desire for an independent review.”134 This seemingly
cynical use of the grand jury was among the reasons the public and many
126. See, e.g., Kate Levine, The Ultimate Conflict, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/local_prosecutor_bob_mcculloch_should_not_
be_the_one_to_decide_whether_to.html.
127. See Transcript of Grand Jury at 9, Missouri v. Wilson (Aug. 20, 2014), http://int.nyt.com/
newsgraphics/2014/11/24/ferguson-evidence/assets/gj-testimony/grand-jury-volume-01.pdf.
128. Id. at 8, 9, 21; cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL: PUB. LAW & LEGAL THEORY
WORKING PAPER GRP., PAPER NO. 14-480, THREE ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2015) (comparing the
cursory review of a death penalty decision in Alabama with the trial-like process in Ferguson).
129. See Witness List, Documents Released in the Ferguson Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/25/us/evidence-released-in-michael-brown-case.html.
130. For all of the evidence and testimony that was released in the Darren Wilson case, see id.
131. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, With Exceptions, Favors the
Police in Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregion/grandjuries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html?_r⫽0.
132. Amy Davidson, What the Eric Garner Grand Jury Didn’t See, NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/eric-garner-grand-jury-didnt-see.
133. McKinley & Baker, supra note 131.
134. Id.
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defense attorneys—who believed the process was infected with bias—have
been so outraged at these nonindictments.135
Most suspects are reflexively charged with as many charges as the substantive law will allow, and without any precharge weighing of the strength of the
evidence by a prosecutor, or a grand jury exposed to a full set of evidence. In
comparison, police suspects get an additional layer of discretionary investigation and evidence weighing.
III. THE PERIL AND PROMISE OF THIS PICTURE
Systematic harms flow from the extra process that prosecutors give almost
exclusively to law enforcement officers. The current distributional state of
precharge/preindictment process is untenable because it favors alreadyadvantaged criminal justice actors, threatens the appearance of justice and the
legitimacy of the criminal law. But despite these problems, stripping the police
of this process is not the solution. Instead, prosecutors should be encouraged or
required to do more thorough precharge investigation and present more evenhanded preindictment cases to grand juries. This Part also considers the practical objection that giving thorough precharge process to all suspects would
effectively shut down the criminal justice system.
A. THE PERILS OF PROCESS FOR THE POLICE

The public’s anger at nonindictments in police-brutality cases tends to focus
on the substantive outcomes—no charges for white police officers killing
unarmed, often young, black men.136 A number of commentators, scholars,137
and lawmakers138 have aimed their criticism at the biased process police
suspects appear to receive. In Ferguson, however, the actual ruling may have
135. See, e.g., Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilsonshooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html; J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand
Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokeholddeath-of-eric-garner.html?_r⫽1.
136. See, e.g., About Us, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Nov.
7, 2015) (stating that the movement was created to address, among other issues, “extrajudicial killings
of Black people by police and vigilantes”). Race has also played a role in the recent and rare conviction
of an officer for killing an unarmed man. Some claim that the conviction of Officer Peter Liang, who is
Chinese, in Brooklyn, New York was not supported by the mostly white police union, and that his
conviction had as much to do with race as with his crime. See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Police Union Turns
Its Back on Cop Who Killed Innocent Man In Brooklyn Stairwell, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 28, 2016, 11:17 AM)
(discussing belief that if Liang had been white, union would have been present at his trial), http://
gothamist.com/2016/01/28/akai_gurley_liang_trial.php; Rick Rojas, In New York, Thousands Protest
Officer Liang’s Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016) (noting that some in the Chinese community
believe Liang was targeted because of his race), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/nyregion/in-newyork-thousands-protest-officer-liangs-conviction.html.
137. See supra note 15.
138. Mason, supra note 15 (describing a California Assembly bill that would substitute an evidentiary hearing for grand jury); Remnick, supra note 15.
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been sensible. The Department of Justice also conducted its own investigation
and came to the same conclusion as the grand jury—that Wilson’s actions were
not criminal.139 All the evidence gathering and weighing may have actually led
to the legally correct result. McCulloch’s seeming law-enforcement bias aside,140
he appears to have done a careful and thorough review of evidence in that case.
But the process that police suspects receive from prosecutors is harmful from
another perspective because it highlights the ways in which prosecutors fail to
use their discretion to investigate and decline charges in the thousands of other
cases that come before them. This prosecutorial process differential is unfair
and threatens the legitimacy of the criminal law by favoring insider suspects
despite the inherent benefits their status already gives them.141
The picture of our criminal justice system is already one of bias and unfairness. Recent attention has uncovered a criminal justice “mill” that does a bad
job distinguishing between the innocent and guilty.142 Moreover, the system
overly punishes thousands of relatively less-guilty suspects who commit crimes
that have little to no bearing on society’s safety.143 Prosecutors can excuse this
ugly picture by noting that they have heavy caseloads and no mechanism for
checking police in every case.144 They have to bring charges and work out the
innocence or relative guilt of a suspect in the plea-bargaining stage.145 Yet they
appear to have ample resources and judgment when it comes to police suspects.
Racial minorities, in heavily policed areas who do not have the resources to
adequately defend themselves are regularly arrested, put in jail, pushed through
the system, and saddled with criminal records that carry a host of debilitating
collateral consequences.146 Yet the police, who contribute to this cycle, are
treated carefully in the rare circumstances in which their potential criminality is

139. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH
MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 86 (2015), http://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_
michael_brown_1.pdf (concluding that the case lacked “prosecutive merit”).
140. See, e.g., Pema Levy, Ferguson Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch’s Long History of Siding With
the Police, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:33 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/12/fergusonprosecutor-robert-p-mccullochs-long-history-siding-police-267357.html.
141. See generally Levine, supra note 99 (discussing formal affirmative rights against interrogation
tactics that police receive through statute or negotiated agreement).
142. See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 39, at 1328 (noting that many factually innocent misdemeanants
plead guilty).
143. Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a
“Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1035–36 (2014) (noting that misdemeanors and ordermaintenance crimes are the most common grist for the “modern criminal justice mill”).
144. See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 7, at 263 (“Prosecutors in many large cities have
caseloads far in excess of the recommended guidelines that scholars often cite to criticize the caseloads
of public defenders.”).
145. Bowers, supra note 11, at 1708 (“Post-charge, prosecutors are prone to consider anything
legitimate that terminates cases quickly.”).
146. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 129 (2009) (noting serious collateral
consequences that flow from pleading guilty to a misdemeanor).
OF
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even discovered and reported. These most sophisticated suspects, who are least
prone to being arrested mistakenly, confessing mistakenly, being housed in jail
while awaiting charges or indictments, or being pushed into a harsh plea
bargain, are also given the greatest chance of never facing charges to begin
with.147
The extra process prosecutors give police also leads to serious optics problems. Citizens who are all but shut out of the criminal justice process see police
getting away with terrible, seemingly criminal behavior. Defense attorneys and
defendants see police getting precharge procedural advantages they could not
dream of.148 It is not hard to understand that the conclusion drawn from these
cases is that the criminal justice system is rigged in favor of those on the inside.
The important due process principle that justice appear just149 grew out of an
earlier rule that judges were presumed to be impartial arbitrators.150 As it
became widely recognized that no person could ever be completely impartial,151
the standard became one of appearance—an aspiration that even if a judge
brought her life experiences and biases to the bench, she should do everything
in her power to set them aside and appear impartial.152
Prosecutors in our criminal justice system perform quasi-judicial functions,
and they are often the main contact that outsiders have with the justice system.153 Thus, we should seek to ensure that prosecutors also appear unbiased.154
When prosecutors and police appear to team up to arrest and convict as many
people as possible while rigging the system so that no charges or indictments

147. See Levine, supra note 99.
148. See David Feige, Fairness in Ferguson, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/11/darren_wilson_grand_jury_ferguson_prosecutor_
opens_proceedings_to_both_sides.html.
149. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988) (noting that a
potentially biased judge must recuse himself “to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even
the appearance of impropriety whenever possible”).
150. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
191, 250 (2012).
151. See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237,
250–52 (1987) (noting that judges brought experience and biases to the bench but that disqualification
for appearance of bias was still important); Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1638 (2012) (“Often we think that reality is insulated from any influence that
can be linked to appearance, but sometimes an appearance becomes the basis for conduct that fosters a
corresponding reality over time, and sometimes the concepts collapse in the first place.”).
152. See Geyh, supra note 150, at 250 (“[I]n the 1970s, federal and state laws were revised to
require disqualification whenever a judge was biased or his ‘impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’”); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 45–46 (1987) (“This
aspiration to impartiality, however, is just that—an aspiration rather than a description—because it may
suppress the inevitability of the existence of a perspective and thus make it harder for the observer, or
anyone else, to challenge the absence of objectivity.”).
153. Cf. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 457 (1992) (“Whether
American prosecutors can be . . . ‘ministers of justice’ . . . or should ‘temper zeal with human kindness’ . . . are unanswerable questions in a criminal justice model that emphasizes crime control over
protecting individual rights.”).
154. See Levine, supra note 12 (arguing that prosecutors must satisfy the appearance standard).
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are brought when they are suspected of crimes, the appearance of justice is
sullied.
This appearance problem threatens the legitimacy of the criminal law.155
Scholars such as Tom Tyler and others have conducted empirical work in an
attempt to determine what makes the criminal law legitimate to those who must
obey its dictates.156 This research has shown that what people care most about
from legal authorities is “procedural justice.”157 They want law enforcement to
appear unbiased and process to be distributed in an evenhanded and fairseeming manner.158 In other words, the comparative substantive outcome of a
defendant’s case matters less to her than the sense that she was treated fairly by
unbiased legal actors.159 This work showed further that these precepts not only
made people believe the system was fairer, but also motivated them to obey the
criminal law for reasons other than fear of being apprehended.160
When prosecutors distribute procedures unfairly to other insiders, the system’s legitimacy is seriously threatened. Citizens who might otherwise trust
authorities are given reason to doubt them, and citizens whose contact with the
justice system already leads to distrust are given even more reason to believe
that law enforcement officials are biased.
B. THE PROMISE OF PRECHARGE/PREINDICTMENT PROCESS

Given the many systemic harms triggered by additional precharge/preindictment process for police suspects, it is little wonder that legal academics,
politicians, and citizens are in favor of reducing the advantages that police
suspects receive from prosecutors.161 In this section, however, I argue that the
opposite solution is far more powerful. In fact, the process given to police
precharge or preindictment might not only be fairer,162 but also more accurate in
terms of fewer innocent suspects being charged and a more practical allocation
of prosecutorial resources.163

155. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6–7 (noting that the normative view of procedural justice views people as concerned with
procedural aspects of their experience rather than the outcome of their criminal justice contact).
158. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND COURTS 14–15 (2002) (noting that people will be more deferential to the law if they see law
enforcement as unbiased).
159. TYLER, supra note 155, at 73 (noting that “the perception of unequal treatment . . . is the single
most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system”).
160. Id. at 110 (showing that “the fairness of procedures enhances or diminishes . . . future compliance with the law”).
161. See supra note 15.
162. See Wright & Miller, supra note 11, at 33 (“The public in general, and victims in particular,
lose faith in a system where the primary goal is processing and the secondary goal is justice.”).
163. See Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, a Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
143, 145 (2011) (arguing that “the prosecutor has a mechanism to ease her own [excessive caseload]
pain—that is, prosecutorial discretion”).
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The process police receive tells us something exciting and potentially transformative about the criminal justice machine. Prosecutors, when they have the
will, can serve as a finger in the dam of criminal justice harshness. Grand juries
too have the capacity to be much more than the irrelevant, rubber-stamping
institutions they have become.164 Moreover, there is a whole world of precharge
and preindictment decision making that has an enormous impact on defendants,
not to mention administrative costs.
The process prosecutors give to police tells us something about their motivations. When they are charging or indicting an ordinary suspect, the context of
the crime, the criminogenic factors that led to it, and the harm to the defendant’s
reputation, family, and life are not factors that outweigh a prosecutor’s goals to
charge and eventually convict when they can.165 These motivations, however,
are upended when a police officer’s life is on the line: prosecutors work closely
with the police, rely on them for every case they try, and their relationships may
bleed from professional to social.166 In other words, they are looking at a police
suspect with a world of context and understanding that is simply missing when
an ordinary suspect is before them.167
But what would it look like if prosecutors approached all potential defendants
with the same sensitivity they use with police defendants? It would mean that
they would pause and think before charging; it would mean that factual accuracy became the paramount goal; it would mean that they might consider the
normative value of a conviction rather than the ease of achieving one. In other
words, it would mean a turn to precharge/preindictment process—the same
process afforded the police.
Precharge/preindictment process for all defendants has many theoretical advantages. The most obvious is that it might stem the tide of false convictions.168 If
prosecutors actually investigated cases, questioned police statements, listened to
a suspect’s story, and questioned potential witnesses before charging a case,
they would inevitably intercept innocent people before they were swept into the
criminal justice machine.169 Such a practice would also help law enforcement—
discovering that a suspect is innocent before she is charged would allow police
164. See supra note 97.
165. See generally Bowers, supra note 11; Natapoff, supra note 39.
166. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 749, 792 (2003) (“[O]ne ought not underestimate the unifying influence of a shared commitment
to ‘getting the bad guys,’ hardened by the adversarial process, nurtured by mutual respect and need, and
on occasion lubricated by alcohol.”).
167. Id.; see also Levine, supra note 12.
168. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 527 (2005) (studying hundreds of exonerations and noting that “it is
certain—this is the clearest implication of our study—that many defendants who are not on this list, no
doubt thousands, have been falsely convicted of serious crimes but have not been exonerated”).
169. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 337
(2001) (“[T]he prosecutor’s role as a minister of justice [is] to protect innocent persons from wrongful
convictions . . . [as evidenced in] the ethical rules that require a prosecutor to have confidence in the
truth of the criminal charge . . . .”).
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to continue searching for the person who actually committed the crime while
evidence remained relatively fresh.
Precharge scrutiny would also force prosecutors to consider the normative
value of a given charge. For instance, if a prosecutor’s usual practice was to
investigate all cases precharge, she would have to think carefully about which
cases were actually worth prosecuting. For example, even if a trespassing case,
where someone was arrested for being in public housing without proper identification,170 seemed easy to charge and convict, would it be worth the process?
This is the opposite of the logic under which prosecutors currently operate.171
Because they do not conduct precharge investigations, these small, socially
harmless cases are the easiest to close, and therefore the most likely to be
charged.172 If we upend the reflexive charging process, an entire world emerges
where minimally harmful cases are dismissed leaving time and resources to
investigate more serious cases before a suspect becomes a defendant.173
And what of grand juries? Should prosecutors have to investigate and present
exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence to a grand jury to get an indictment? In theory, presenting exculpatory evidence would lead to a more accurate, legitimate, and democratic indictment process. For instance, imagine a
case where the only evidence of a crime is an eyewitness—a notoriously
unreliable yet overused source of evidence174—what if the prosecutor had to
actually call this witness to testify? A number of positive results would flow
from such a rule: the witness would have to appear in court and testify under
oath in front of other citizens. This might well help prosecutors sort out, before
indictment, whether an eyewitness was as reliable as the police suggested,
whether she was motivated enough to go through with the process, and whether
she was a credible witness.
Moreover, the grand jury would have an actual role in the process. In other
words it would insert, at a crucial moment, a check from criminal justice

170. Such arrests are an ongoing phenomenon in New York City public housing. A 2010 lawsuit
claimed that tenants and their guests were routinely charged with trespassing during “vertical sweeps”
where police came into the houses looking for criminal activity. In 2008, there were 5,841 such arrests.
See Cara Buckley, Lawsuit Takes Aim at Trespassing Arrests in New York Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/nyregion/30housing.html?_r⫽1.
171. See supra Section II.A. There are, of course, some exceptions to this statement. See, e.g.,
Stephanie Clifford, Proposal to Limit Prosecutions of Marijuana Cases in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2014) (discussing District Attorney Kenneth Thompson’s policy decision not to prosecute people
for possession of small amounts of marijuana), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/nyregion/inbrooklyn-proposing-to-end-prosecutions-for-low-level-marijuana-offenses.html.
172. See supra Section II.A.
173. See Wright & Miller, supra note 11, at 52 (“Screening can prevent arbitrary allocation of
resources and inconsistent decisions in prosecution more generally.”).
174. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 934 (1984) (reviewing unreliability of eyewitness testimony, particularly cross-racial
identifications).
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outsiders on prosecutor’s incentives and judgment.175 Not only would this make
the process more fair and potentially more accurate for defendants. It would
also go a long way toward restoring the image of criminal justice as a democratic process worthy of citizens’ trust.176
Of course, precharge process, and particularly presenting full cases to grand
juries, is economically impossible in our current system. It would be impossible
to investigate every minor case or hold a “mini-trial” for every serious case. But
this raises the bigger question of why we have so many cases in our criminal
justice system to begin with.177 Hundreds of thousands of people, some factually innocent, are convicted of felonies and misdemeanors and criminally
punished every year.178 Politicians on both the right and the left already
recognize that this is an untenable way to proceed.179 Giving such cases serious
consideration before charging them should be considered as one possible solution to our mass incarceration problem.
There should also be more careful sorting of felony cases that require
indictments. Many drug crimes are felonies.180 In such cases, an indictment or
judicial finding of probable cause is necessary. Treating the grand jury as a
rubber stamp has allowed prosecutors to indict and convict thousands of drug
defendants, charged with possession of small amounts of illegal or prescription
drugs.181 Furthermore, the people who are being arrested and convicted for

175. See Washburn, supra note 29, at 2352 (“Despite the widespread belief that the grand jury’s role
is to serve as a check on the prosecutor, the grand jury is widely criticized for failing to live up to this
role.”).
176. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 30, at 65 (“The numbers suggest that a strong majority of grand
jurors perceived [their] role as useful and important to our criminal justice system. [They believed] that
public participation in the criminal justice system enhances the fairness of the proceeding . . . .”).
177. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 289 (2014) (arguing prosecutors
have an ethical duty to reduce amount of defendants in the system by exercising prosecutorial
discretion not to prosecute).
178. See PETER WAGNER & LEAH SAKALA, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE
PIE (2014) (noting that almost 300,000 people are in jail for minor offenses).
179. See, e.g., Bipartisan Justice Reform Bill is Best Chance in a Generation to Reduce Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/bipartisanjustice-reform-bill-best-chance-generation-reduce-incarceration (discussing the merits of a bipartisan
senate bill aimed at reducing mass incarceration).
180. See, e.g., New York Drug Possession Laws, FINDLAW, http://statelaws.findlaw.com/new-york-law/
new-york-drug-possession-laws.html#sthash.kLGS5iz8.dpuf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).
A defendant convicted of a class A-1 felony (possession of eight or more ounces of substances
containing a narcotic drug or 5,760 milligrams of methadone) may be sentenced to a term of 8
to 20 years imprisonment or a fine of $100,000. Convictions of class B to class E felonies
range from sentences of a minimum of one year to a maximum of 1.5 to 9 years or fines
ranging from $15,000 to $30,000 for class B and class C felonies.
Id.
181. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological
and Humanitarian Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 24 (2009) (“[D]rug crimes account for the most
[prison] admissions.”); Lisa R. Nakdai, Note, Are New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws Killing the
Messenger for the Sake of the Message?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 560 (2001) (“[D]rug felonies are
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these drug crimes are far from the only people actually committing them. It is
well known that wealthy and poor, white and African-American people use
drugs at the same rate.182 And yet a look at who is incarcerated for such
“crimes” yields an entirely different racial picture.183 As we search for ways to
reduce the effects of the war on drugs, asking prosecutors to weigh the
seriousness of cases, to examine evidence, and to bring such cases before a
body of citizens who may make their own decisions about the merits of a case is
an attractive solution.184 Even assuming such a solution is not practically
possible, however, the power of its suggestion is clear: the way the indictment
process works is a choice, not a mandate.
Michelle Alexander has explored the question of what would happen if every
defendant who could chose to exercise her right to a trial. She argues that the
exercise of this right would make our current system impossible to continue.185
Although such an opinion may seem polemical rather than practical, it does ask
us to consider several seemingly settled questions about our current system.
Individually, many defendants are well-counseled to take plea bargains and
avoid the possibility of a longer sentence after a trial, but in the aggregate it is
clear that that the system has been allowed to balloon to its current state, in part,
because such rights are not exercised.186 The alternative of testing charges
before a grand jury brings up the same kinds of questions: What would happen
if citizens insisted on their right to participate in the decision of whether to
charge a criminal suspect? What if citizens rejected the current state of the
grand jury system and insisted that they hear from actual witnesses, rather than
police hearsay about what witnesses saw? What if prosecutors were required to
present exculpatory evidence rather than evidence geared only toward achieving
indictment? At a higher level, we might ask, why does our current system
exist?187 And why do we simply accept the response that it would be impossible
to give preindictment process to all defendants because of resource constraints?

considered the ‘single most significant factor underlying the remarkable growth of the prison population’ in New York.”).
182. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
184. For articles discussing the historical role of grand jurors as making normative decisions about
the merits of laws, rather than simply weighing facts, see supra note 97; see also Bowers, supra note
30, at 321 (suggesting a grand jury for misdemeanors that weighs the worthiness of charges in
low-level cases).
185. Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html
(“The system of mass incarceration depends almost entirely on the cooperation of those it seeks to
control. If everyone charged with crimes suddenly exercised his constitutional rights, there would not
be enough judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the ensuing tsunami of litigation.”).
186. Id.
187. Washburn, supra note 29, at 2346 (arguing that “the historical narrative [of grand juries] . . . suggests some other roles and responsibilities [not valued in the modern conception]: considering the legitimacy of laws, and/or considering the legitimacy of the application of those laws in a
particular case”).
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Prosecutors have limited resources. What they do with those resources,
however, is a choice. One choice that prosecutors have tended to make is to
reserve process only for the police and a select few other suspects who have the
resources to challenge the process at every stage.188 This is certainly one way to
preserve resources, but it is not the fairest, most accurate, or most systemically
legitimate way to do so, leading to a picture of favoritism, collusion, and bias
toward favored suspects. It is also not necessarily the most cost effective. In
fact, investing more resources upfront may reduce costs by reducing charges,
convictions, and incarcerations generally. Of course, such reduction would have
to come from smart choices, but precharge process is one mechanism to ensure
that such choices are based on more thoughtful reasoning. We can imagine such
process would lead to fewer people who are prosecuted, incarcerated, forced to
undergo costly monitoring, and lose economic opportunities through collateral
consequences and the stigma of a conviction.189 In terms of innocent suspects, it
will also save states money in the form of costly appeals and civil lawsuits.190
CONCLUSION
Our current system of charging and indicting goes something like this: if you
are an ordinary criminal suspect, arrested for a misdemeanor, a prosecutor
charges you reflexively, without investigation into the facts and circumstances
of your case. That charge almost always leads to a conviction. If you are
arrested for a felony, you are charged with several crimes, and a grand jury
indicts you based on a quick, curated, and prosecutor-dominated process.
Because you are charged with so many different crimes, you plead guilty to
some rather than face trial for all of them. Your case is never investigated. Or,
you wait in jail for months or more while your case is investigated, and plea
bargaining occurs. You still probably plead guilty.
If you are a police officer accused of a crime, your case is thoroughly
investigated precharge. Prosecutors speak to any witness they can, review all
the evidence, and think seriously about the charges and defenses to those
charges. If your case is brought to a grand jury, you and any witness to the
crime will testify, and the grand jury will spend weeks considering the charges
in your case. Your chance of facing no charges is dramatically increased.

188. White-collar offenders are the most salient example of these other privileged defendants. See,
e.g., Rebecca A. Pinto, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1343, 1363–64 (1999) (“One reason for the noted under-enforcement of white-collar crimes
may be that prosecutors must invest more resources to prevail in white-collar cases than in other
cases . . . . [A] prosecutor might decline to bring meritorious white-collar crime cases because she
believes that she can more easily ‘win’ cases against indigent defendants in street crime cases.”).
189. For a thorough exploration of the collateral consequences associated with imprisonment, see
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
190. See Marshall, supra note 46.
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Moreover, you are treated like a potential suspect whose own version of events
matters.
This process differential is unfair. It leads to serious systemic harms that have
come to light recently. This realization has led many to call for less process for
police. This Article has argued that the far more desirable conclusion is to give
more process to the rest of us. Anyone serious about criminal justice reform
needs to consider how prosecutors treat police suspects. The process they give
their law enforcement partners has much to tell us about how to create a better
system for everyone.

